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Reviewed by Owen Goldin, Marquette University, 6145goldino@vms.csd.mu.edu. 
For many years, the standard English translation of Plato's Sophist was that of F. M. Cornford, 
printed, with running commentary, in Plato's Theory of Knowledge.1 Though Cornford's 
commentary greatly advanced the understanding of the dialogue, the translation was deeply 
flawed in a number of respects, most notably in the shift in the translation of O)/N from "being" 
to "real." This made it difficult for the reader to follow the line of the argument, and assumed 
that EI)=NAI is adequately understood as a monadic predicate, a position which was 
conclusively refuted by Kahn and Owen.2  
Recent years have seen three worthy successors to Cornford, in translations of the Sophist by 
Benardete,3 Cobb4 and White.5 Cobb and, to an even greater degree, Benardete, strive for a 
highly literal translation, with consist rendering of Greek terms, and attention to the details of 
expression. Proponents of readings of the dialogues as dramas have argued that such translations 
are necessary if the translation is not to erase the suggestive details that Plato inserted in his 
writing as indications for the careful reader, and if readers are not to be misled by a translator's 
facile interpretation of Plato's difficult views.6 The translations of both Benardete and Cobb are 
admirably successes in this regard. But that of Benardete is available only conjoined with a long 
and difficult commentary, which put forward (in an esoteric manner) an unorthodox esoteric 
reading of the text, so it is not an attractive text for undergraduate classes. Cobb's translation is 
available only in a hardbound edition, which limits its purchasers to primarily libraries.  
White, an analytic philosopher attracted to the Sophist for its probing discussions of meaning and 
reference, produced a translation that is exceptionally clear and faithful in Plato's technical 
discussion of these issues, and has the bonus of a lucid introduction concentrating on this 
discussion. This, its easy availability, and its affordable price, have quickly made it the current 
standard. Unfortunately, White's introduction pays little attention to what Plato indicates is the 
primary focus of the dialogue, the difference between the philosophy and sophistry. Further, the 
passages that are not directly concerned with meaning and reference are given a fluid, free 
rendering, that, although superior to that of Cornford, hides details of drama and language from 
the reader who cares to explore them.  
We now have an outstanding new translation by Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem, which has virtues 
of its own, and in most respects easily rivals the other translations.  
The translators, squarely in the camp of those paying close attention to the dialogue as drama, 
have striven for as accurate, literal and translation as possible. Care is taken to render one Greek 
word (or root) by one in English.7 (Of course this has not always possible in an accurate and 
intelligible translation, but in the present translation deviations from the principle are remedied 
by an excellent glossary which gives both Greek and the various English alternatives, and 
explains the etymological and semantic relations that hold among clusters of important words.) 
Particles are translated or reflected stylistically. Care is taken in giving exact renderings of even 
the slightest of Theaetetus' replies. Thus the reader, instead of the translator, can be the judge of 
the significance of the details of drama and expression.8  
Literal translations, especially of literary works like the the dialogues of Plato, often strike the 
reader as unduly difficult and stiff, rife with odd locutions. This is certainly a problem faced by 
the translations of Benardete and Cobb. In contrast, the translation of Brann, Kalkavage, and 
Salem reads naturally and gracefully, preserving the freshness and clarity of the Greek. On 
almost every page, the reader is struck by particularly felicitous renderings.9 Unlike the freer 
translations of Cornford and White, the language sometimes seems odd, but this is only when 
there are good reasons for believing that something can be learned from preserving the way in 
which the interlocutors actually express themselves.  
The translators tell us the translators tried to have "the translation of the most frequent and 
weighty words should be as unrestrained and nontechnical as possible, preserving the still fresh 
root meaning and suggestive connotations of a Greek vocabulary just on the point of becoming 
fixed and philosophical in the technical sense" (p. 14). Thus MEQO/DOS is rendered "way," 
I)DE/A as "look," A)RXH/ as "beginning," OU)SI/A as "beinghood," SHMAI/NEIN as "point 
to" and so forth. Though perhaps inspired by Heidegger's insistence that the vocabulary of Greek 
thought must be uncovered from the later theoretical accretions, the present translation nowhere 
in this regard falls prey to Heideggerian excess.  
The edition has an admirable introduction, primarily written for the able undergraduate and 
general reader. The focus of the introduction is the teaching of the dialogue on the distinction 
between the human activities of sophistry and philosophy, and how the way of inquiry taken by 
the Stranger bears on this issue. (There is little on issues of linguistic and logical analysis, which 
are at the center of White's introduction.)  
A word should be said on how Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem deal with one of the most difficult 
issues they face. The phrases TO\ O)/N can refer to either a particular thing that is, or to that 
feature that all things that are have in common. The translator must avoid Cornford's mistake of 
switching the translation of the phrase midway through the argument. In accordance with most of 
the current interpretations of Parmenides' poem (to which the Stranger refers), recent translations 
of the Sophist usually have opted for the translation "that which is" or the like. On the other 
hand, this poses problems when translating the passage discussing the five great Forms, when the 
phrase primarily refers to something in which a things participates. Thus, Brann, Kalkavage, and 
Salem, alone among recent translators into English, opt for "Being." Consistency then demands 
that TO\ MH\ O)/N be rendered as Non-Being. But the questions that the Stranger raises 
concerning TO\ MH\ O)/N are not in regard to a Form of Nonbeing, in which things participate; 
they concern the possibility of a thing which is not anything at all. This is one case in which 
there is no wholly satisfactory option.10  
Scholars who consult this translation will be disappointed by the decision to not follow scholarly 
practice in indicating the primary edition employed, and where variant readings are followed. I 
detected only two misprints: p. 15 "kinis" for "kin is" and p. 71 "haviking" for "having." The 
book is attractively produced, and very reasonably priced.  
This translation of the Sophist excels in lucidity, accuracy and style. Except in cases in which an 
instructor sees fit to assign White's fine introductory essay on the dialogue's logical and linguistic 
analyses, this is the best English Sophist for both student and scholar, and promises to be the 
standard for many years to come.  
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"Plato on Not-Being," in Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City. 
NY, 1970, repr. Notre Dame, IN, 1978), pp. 223-67, repr. in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science, and 
Dialectic, ed. M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY, 1986), pp. 104-37.  
3. S. Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, Chicago, 
1984.  
4. W.S. Cobb, Plato's Sophist, Savage, Md., 1990.  
5. N. P. White, Plato's Sophist, Translated with Introduction and Notes, Indianapolis, 1993.  
6. The most famous defense of this approach to translating Plato is the preface to A. Bloom, The 
Republic of Plato, Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay, New York, 1968, pp. vii-xx.  
7. A small lapse in consistency is the translation of GUMNASTIKH/ as "gymnastics" at 227a 
and "physical training" at 229a.  
8. It seems to me that at one point the translation falters here. Twice (233c and 268c), when the 
translators wish to point to the etymological connection of SOFO/S and SOFISTH/S, the latter is 
rendered as "Professor of Wisdom." The translators' introduction indicates that some stress is to 
be laid on the "professor" part of this formula: "... [T]he philosopher and sophist engage in like 
activities, though they diverge along others, as must an aspiring lover of wisdom diverge from a 
confident professor of wisdom. The sophist will appear as a universal expert, and the philosopher 
as a perpetual amateur of sorts." (p. 4). This profound distinction is Socratic to the core, but it is 
not clear to that the Stranger anywhere proffers it. S. Rosen, Plato's Sophist: The Drama of 
Original and Image (New Haven, 1983) has argued that the Stranger, unlike the Socratic 
questioner, understands the philosopher as one who has a TE/XNH in the sense of a technique, 
applicable to all kinds, blind to the distinction between high and low in human affairs. On this 
view, the Stranger, not Socrates, is one who is able to produce and profess a determinate body of 
knowledge, while the teaching of Plato is that philosophy must embody both this approach and 
that of Socrates. Rosen's view is controversial; my point is that concerning this issue of 
importance the translation is not neutral.  
9. I must be content to give only one example Consider 236d1-3: A)LL' O)/NTWS 
QAUMASTO\S A(NH\R KAI\ KATIDEI=N PAGXA/LEPOS, E)PEI\ KAI\ NU=N MA/LA 
EU)= KAI\ KOMYW=S EI)S A)/PORON EI)=DOS DIEREUNH/SASQAI KATAPE/FEUGEN. 
Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem render this as "But the man is wondrous in his very being and 
utterly difficult to keep in our sights, since even now he's fled, in very good and clever fashion, 
down into a form that leaves no passage for our tracking." Compare Benardete: "But in his being, 
the man's amazing and very difficult to be caught sight of, since even now he has very skillfully 
and elegantly fled into a species that affords no way for a definite tracking" and White: "He's 
really an amazing man -- very hard to make out. He's still escaped neatly into an impossibly 
confusing type to search through." Benardete's translation is literal, but the rendering of 
EI)=DOS as "species" is questionable, on account of the technical use to which Aristotle puts it, 
and the sentence is wooden to the point of being painful to read. White's breezy translation has a 
pleasant conversational tone, but loses the metaphor of the downward pursuit that has been 
prominent throughout the Stranger's divisions. Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem preserve the best of 
both approaches.  
10. A related point: The rendering of TO\ MHDAMW=S O)/N at 237b ("And tell me: I suppose 
we do dare to pronounce Utter-non-being?") is unfortunate; the (nowadays) more usual rendering 
of "that which in no way is" (or, alternatively, Non-being in all respects) is in accordance with 
scholarly consensus that the pre-Aristotelian use of EI)=NAI is least implicitly dyadic, and 
would foreshadow the results of the Stranger's identification of "to not be" as always "to not be 
something-or-other," i.e., "to be other than something-or-other."  
 
